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Abstract 
The relative contribution of European Union Allowances (EUAs) and Certified 
Emission Reductions (CERs) to the price discovery of their common true value 
has been empirically studied using daily data with inconclusive results. In this 
paper, we study the short-run and long-run price dynamics between EUAs and 
CERs future contracts using intraday data. We report a bidirectional feedback 
causality relationship both in the short-run and in the long-run, with the EUA's 
market being the leader. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The 2004/101/EC Directive of the European Parliament, known as the “Linking 
Directive", allows governments to use Kyoto certificates from the so-called 
project-based flexible mechanisms so as to cover their domestic greenhouse 
gas emissions. One of these mechanisms is the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM), through a CDM project; a developed country will implement 
an emissions reduction project in developing countries in order to generate 
credits known as Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs). Each CER represents 
a successful emission reduction of one tonne of carbon dioxide, which must be 
certified by the CDM Executive Board of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
 
Since 2008, CERs and EUAs are being traded in electronic markets. The 
possibility of having simultaneous prices in organized markets for both 
entitlements has encouraged the interest for analyzing the relative contribution 
of CERs and EUAs markets to the price discovery process in the energy and 
climate literature. In a cointegration setting, Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2011), for 
the period March 2007 to March 2009, and Chevalier (2010), for the period 
March 2007 to January 2010, find that EUA prices and CER prices have a 
significant causal influence on each other, but with EUA's future markets 
leading the price discovery. Quite the opposite, Nazifi (2010) concludes that 
EUAs and CERs do not have a common long-run component between May 
2007 and September 2008. In the short-run, CER prices do not have a 
statistically significant effect on EUA prices, while EUA prices do drive CERs 
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prices. Finally, for the period July 2007 to December 2008, Mizrach (2010) finds 
that the null of no common factors between the EUAs and CERs prices cannot 
be rejected, corroborating Nazifi's (2010) conclusion; he argues that the lack of 
cointegration is due to uncertainties about the eligibility and bankability of 
certain types of CER credits. In a nutshell, in spite of considering overlapping 
periods, the existing empirical evidence is inconclusive. 
 
All previous studies have analyzed the relative role CERs and EUAs play in 
price discovery using exclusively daily data. Indeed, there are only a few 
empirical studies in the literature using intraday data about these markets.1
 
 Co-
integration models capture "long-run" equilibrium relationships wherein prices 
can mutually diverge in the short-run but they readjust to persistent cointegrated 
patterns. As pointed out by Harris et al. (1995, p. 567), “we must guard against 
observation intervals so long that error correction takes place within rather than 
between [them]”. Accordingly, daily data may not detect error correction that 
takes place at higher trading frequencies.  
In this paper, we use a unique database of intraday trading data from the most 
active future markets on EUAs and CERs to study the price discovery process. 
                                                 
1 The following papers study CO2 markets using intraday data. Benz et al. (2008) analyzes the liquidity of 
EUAs in ECX and Nord Pool platforms, for the period February 2005 - December 2007. Bredin et al. 
(2009) analyzes the market microstructure focusing on the interaction between trading volume and price 
volatility for the period April 2005 - May 2007. Conrad et al. (2010) models the dynamics of EUAs with 
data from November 2006 to December 2008. Mizrach and Otsubo (2010) analyzes the microstructure of 
the European Climate Exchange, both for EUAs and CERs, for data from the hole year 2009. Rittler 
(2009) models the relationship between Phase II EUA spot and futures prices, analyzing the causality in 
the first and second conditional moment, for the period from May 2008 to March 2009. Rotfuss (2009) 
analyzes the EUAs price formation and volatility for the period June 2005 to September 2008. Rotfuss et 
al. (2009) examines the prize formation in the EU ETS and proposes a model of expectation-formation. 
The data goes from April 2005 to September 2008. Finally Vinokur (2009) analyzes the impact of 
banking and submission constraints for both Phase I and II EUAs and CERs spot data, in Bluenext and 
for the period June 2005 - August 2009. 
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We find a bidirectional feedback causality relationship exists both in the short-
run and in the long-run, with the EUA's market being the leader. 
 
The reminder of this article is structured as follows: Section 2 focuses on the 
carbon market description, pointing out the offsets particularities, and shows the 
theoretical aspects which describe the relationship between EUAs and CERs. 
Section 3 describes the data and the methodology used in the study. Section 4 
presents the empirical analysis and section 5 concludes. 
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2. Carbon market 
 
2.1. European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
 
The EU ETS is the world’s largest market in emissions allowances, each 
emission allowance being an entitlement to emit one tonne of carbon dioxide 
equivalent gas. EUAs are distributed by EU governments to the companies 
covered by the 2003/87/EC directive, a total of 11,500 energy-intensive 
installations across the EU, so as to limit the total amount of greenhouse 
emissions and thereby comply with their Kyoto emission targets. In the 
framework of the EU ETS it is possible to trade both EUAs and CERs as 
mechanisms of flexibility developed by the European Union in order to reach the 
reduction objective in the period 2008-2012.  
 
It is important to emphasize some aspects of the EU ETS which have 
conditioned and will condition its development. Firstly, the EU ETS is 
constituted by different Phases, Phase I was a pilot/learning Phase which goes 
from 2005 to 2007, characterized by an excess of rights which inevitably 
produced a collapse in their prices leaving them near to zero. Phase II concords 
with the Kyoto Protocol accomplishment period and goes from 2008 to 2012. 
Phase III will contain the period 2013-2020. The importance of the Phases 
resides in the possibility of transferring EUAs between years in the same 
Phase. However, this possibility changes between Phases. Thus, banking was 
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not allowed between Phase I and Phase II, but is accepted between Phase II 
and Phase III. Furthermore, borrowing is prohibited between Phases. 2
 
  
2.2. Linking Directive and CERs 
 
The 2004/101/EC Directive of the European Parliament permits the use of 
CERs to cover their domestic greenhouse gas emissions, in a certain 
percentage, in order to promote reductions of greenhouse gas emissions in a 
economically efficient manner. These CERs can be imported into the EU ETS 
for compliance purposes from project activities which have to be approved by 
one or more Annex I Parties in accordance with Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol 
and the decisions adopted pursuant to the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol, and 
are fully fungible with European Union Allowances (EUAs), with a limit which 
varies between countries. Following the Article 7 of the Linking Directive, each 
Member State will decide on this limit, having due regard to the relevant 
provisions of the Kyoto Protocol and the Marrakesh Accords, to meet the 
requirements therein that the use of the mechanisms should be supplemental to 
domestic action. Trotignon (2010) reports these percentage limits that vary 
between 0% and 20% depending on countries and sectors, being the average 
about 13.5% (1,420Mt for the period 2008-2012).3
                                                 
2 Banking refers to the possibility of transfering entitlements from one year to the following one 
and borrowing to the possibility of using entitlements from the following year in the present one.  
 In addition and in 
accordance with the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, CERs generated from 
3 The Kyoto Protocol allows all the countries to bank CERs from Phase II to Phase III up to a 
maximum of 2.5% of a country's assigned amount, but not borrowing. Additionally, any unused 
portion of their Phase II limits may be used in Phase III. The banking and borrowing within the 
years of the Phase II, are permitted until the respective country limits being reached, however, 
both of them are prohibited in Hungary, Latvia, and Lithuania, representing 7% of the potential 
CERs imports. Furthermore, the borrowing is prohibited in Italy, Norway, Poland, Spain and 
United Kingdom, and represents 37% of the potential CERs imports. See Trotignon (2010) for 
further details. 
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nuclear facilities can’t be used for their commitments, as well as the totally from 
land use, land use change and forestry activities.  
 
Theoretically speaking, the substitutability between EUAs and CERs should 
lead to the fulfilment of the Law of One Price, which establishes that assets that 
have the same expected future payoff should have the same price today. 
However, since CERs began to trade in 2008, EUAs have been quoted above 
CERs, both in spot and futures markets. Specifically, the difference between the 
future prices of EUAs and CERs with the same maturity date at any time t can 
be written as 
 
( , ) ( , ) ( , )t t tEUA T T CER T T SPREAD T T t T T′ ′ ′ ′= + ≤ ≤    [1] 
 
where ( , )tEUA T T ′  and ( , )tCER T T ′  are the prices of an EUA futures contract and a 
CER futures contract, respectively, with maturity at T and corresponding to the 
same market Phase ending at T’. ( , )tSPREAD T T ′  is the difference between both 
prices.4
 
  
Following Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2011), there are two main factors that may 
explain the positive observed spread: (i) market agents need to be able to buy 
CERs on the market and exchange them with actual EUAs from their own 
                                                 
4 Technically any divergence in prices between EUAs and CERs that compensates for 
transaction costs, such as bid-ask spreads and fees, should be immediately exploited in the 
futures market by installations that have EUAs, by selling EUAs and buying CERs until its limit 
of CERs that can be surrendered is reached. Trotignon (2010) shows that, in 2008 and 2009, 
polluters have not surrendered as many CERs as they could have, meaning that either they are 
not taking profit from the lower price of CERs relative to EUAs or they are keeping the limit of 
CERs for future accomplishments.  
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registry in order to benefit fully from the arbitrage operation; and (ii), the limits 
established for countries and sectors concerning the use of CERs towards 
compliance within the European trading system.  
 
This implies that the arbitrage opportunity of buying CERs and selling EUAs is 
limited in quantity and through time and it will be highly conditioned by 
uncertainties about the future demand and supply of both EUAs and CERs. On 
one hand, the recent international economic crisis has augmented the doubts 
among participants in the carbon market about the possible less final amount of 
EUAs that large emitters will need to cover their emissions in Phase II. On the 
other hand, the lack of a plain regulatory regime for CERs post 2012, and the 
likely exclusion or restriction in Phase III of CERs generated by certain type of 
projects, generate uncertainty about the future supply of CERs.5
                                                 
5 From 2013 on, the use of CERs from projects involving trifluoromethane (HFC-23) and nitrous 
oxide (N2O) from adipic acid production will be limited because of the exceptionally high rates of 
chlorodifluoromethane (HCFC-22) derived from the destruction of HFC-23. Since these projects 
represent about 50% of the total supply of CERs, the effect over the total supply may be 
dramatic. For more details, see (
 By supplying 
an extra quantity of CERs, the demand for EUAs would decrease and, 
consequently the EUA prices would also decrease. This is the reason why 
some carbon traders point out CERs as the main reason for weakening EUA 
prices. However, other traders think that a possible declining demand from 
EUAs, due to the crisis, and the consequent EUA price falling would lead to a 
decrease in CERs prices. The purpose of this research is to study the relative 
contribution of each market to the price discovery process.  
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/news_2010_11_en.htm). 
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3. Data and Methodology 
 
There exist several European electronic trading platforms that handle EUAs and 
CERs transactions. Among all of them, the ECX market is by far the most 
active, concentrating nearly the totality of the futures market volume. It is 
important to highlight the increasing liquidity reached in the ECX market 
fostered by the important number of potential users such as the companies 
covered by the Directive 2003/87/CE, external agents and market makers that 
operate in the ECX futures market. Figure I presents the liquidity development 
for ECX futures market data based in the definition of illiquidity presented in 
Amihud (2002) and defined as the daily ratio of absolute returns divided by its 
volume in Euros. It is important to highlight that the illiquidity has decreased 
sharply over the time in all the futures contracts. 
 
[Please insert Figure I] 
 
Specifically, the database consists on trade data from ECX futures market in 
London. For every trade, the database reports the time stamp measured in 
GMT, the traded price in Euros, the maturity of the contract, the traded volume, 
the sign of the transaction and the trade type. We analyze the case of futures 
contracts with maturity in December of each year (from 2008 to 2010) because 
they concentrate almost all the trading activity in the ECX derivative markets. 
Table I reports the most interesting facts derived from these contracts.  
 
[Please insert Table I]  
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As table I shows, EUAs data is available since April 2005, however, CERs data 
is only available since March 2008, when CERs began to trade in screen in the 
ECX futures market. Thus, we discard the data prior to March 2008 to perform 
our price-discovery analysis. Another important feature is that the median price 
of the EUAs futures contract is higher than the median price of the CERs 
futures contract in all cases. This difference, however, has diminished over time 
from 5.6€ to 2.2€ per tonne. Regarding trading frequency, the EUA futures 
contracts are traded in average every 2 minutes, while in the CER futures 
market there is only one trade every fifteen minutes, in average. Because of this 
difference in trading frequency, our study about price discovery is implemented 
using intervals of fifteen-minute length.6
 
 We construct our database taking the 
last available price as the observation for the end of each interval. Overnight 
returns are excluded from the analysis.  
Figure II presents the time-series of prices for 2008, 2009 and 2010 EUAs and 
CERs futures contracts in two different time resolutions: prices every fifteen 
minutes and daily closing prices. Notice that while the settlement price plots 
show the previously reported persistent positive spread between EUAs and 
CERs prices, the intraday data reveals that EUAs and CERs prices converge in 
specific moments along the trading session in the three maturities. These 
crossings in transactions prices are due to over the counter contracts that can 
be bring into the futures market at any time during trading hours. 
                                                 
6 Regarding spot markets, there is one trade, in average, every 15 minutes in the ECX EUA 
spot market while in the ECX CER spot market there is on trade every 176 minutes on average. 
Because of the low trading frequency in CER spot market, we concentrate on derivative 
markets. 
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[Please insert Figure II] 
 
In order to study the short-run and long-run dynamics between EUAs and CERs 
futures prices, we use a traditional co-integration approach. Firstly, we test for 
the existence of unit roots in the time series or prices using the Kwiatkowski et 
al. (1992)7
 
 test. Secondly, we test for co-integration using the very-well known 
methodology proposed by Johansen (1988, 1990, and 1992). Finally, if co-
integration is accepted, we estimate a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM), 
the most common efficient parameterization of a vector of co-integrated 
variables (see Engle and Granger, 1987). The standard error-correction 
representation of the EUAs and CERs prices is: 
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This model allows capturing both the short-run and long-run causality between 
prices. Long-run causality is captured by the error correction term; where Zt-1 is 
the normalized error-correction term that captures deviations from the long-run 
equilibrium relationship. The parameter αj term is the response of the market j to 
a divergence from the other market’s prices. If both δEUA and δCER were 
statistically significant, we would be facing a two-way price discovery process 
(see Harris et al., 1995).  Everything else equal, if the deviation from the 
                                                 
7 Given that standard unit root tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root, Kwiatkowski 
et al. (1992) provides a straightforward test of the null hypothesis of stationarity against the 
alternative of a unit root. 
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equilibrium turns to be positive (Zt-1>0), the CER prices would be expected to 
rise (δCER > 0) and the EUA price would tend to fall (δEUA < 0). Model [2] indicates 
that EUAs and CERs returns change not only in response to deviations form the 
long run equilibrium, but also in response to previous changes in returns and to 
stochastic shocks.  
 
Finally, in order to test long-run and short-run relationships among the time 
series, restrictions on the cointegration vectors, the adjustment coefficients and 
the short-run coefficients in VECM have been imposed to determine if the 
variables are statistically significant.  
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4. Empirical results 
 
Table II summarizes the unit root tests on the six time-series of EUAs and 
CERs prices in logs. The null hypothesis of the Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) test is 
that the time series is stationary. We shorten the sample period of each EUAs 
futures contract so that it overlaps the sample period of each CERs futures 
contract. Table II shows that, in all cases, the hypothesis of level and trend 
stationarity is rejected at the 1% level. When the first difference of the time-
series of prices is considered, however, the null cannot be rejected at the 1% 
level of statistical significance. Therefore, we conclude that all the time series of 
EUAs and CERs prices are integrated of order one, or I(1), time series.  
 
[Please insert Table II] 
 
Next, we study the existence of a long-run or co-integration equilibrium 
relationship between EUAs and CERs futures prices following Johansen (1988, 
1992) methodology. We estimate three bi-variate Vector Autoregressive (VAR) 
models for the EUAs and CERs futures prices, one for each maturity, 2008, 
2009 and 2010. The models incorporate intercept and time trend in data and the 
appropriate lag length has been chosen following the Schwarz Information 
Criterion.  The optimal number of lags is 5 for the 2008 VAR, 2 lags for the 2009 
VAR, and 1 lag for 2010 VAR. The likelihood ratio test procedure proposed by 
Johansen (1988) is applied to test for co-integration. The results of our co-
integration analysis are summarized in Table III. In general, the null hypothesis 
of no co-integration is rejected in all cases. Both the trace statistic and the 
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maximum eigenvalue test suggest that there is at least one co-integration 
vector. 
 
[Please insert Table III] 
 
Panel A of Table IV reports the maximum likelihood ratio tests on the statistical 
significance of the variables in the estimated co-integration vectors (see 
Johansen, 1992, for details). We find that both EUAs and CERS futures prices 
enter in a statistically significant way into the co-integration vectors for all 
maturities. Therefore, in contrast with the daily data analyses of Nafizi (2010) 
and Mizrach (2010), we do find a significant long-run equilibrium relationship 
between EUAs and CERs futures prices. 
 
[Please insert Table IV] 
 
In Panel B of Table IV we report the results of testing the null that a 
deterministic time trend does not enter into the co-integration vector. The 
presence of deterministic components in the co-integration vector would 
suggest that the progressive convergence in EUAs and CERs futures prices 
discussed earlier has an effect on their long-run equilibrium relationship. We 
find that the null of no deterministic trend is rejected at the 1% level of statistical 
significance in all cases. Therefore, we confirm the steady approximation of 
both prices through time. 
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Confirmed the existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship between EUAs 
and CERs futures prices, we proceed to estimate the Vector Error Correction 
Model (VECM) in equation [2] for each maturity. Furthermore, as discussed 
earlier in section 3, Gonzalo and Granger (1995) shows that under the 
assumption that the underlying efficient price is an exact linear combination of 
the observable prices, and it is not Granger-caused by the transitory 
components, the contribution of each market to the discovery of the efficient 
price is given by the vector of factor weights, which is orthogonal to the long-run 
adjustment coefficients vector ( EUAδ , CERδ ), 
 
EUACER
CER
EUA δδ
δω
−
=  and EUACER
EUA
CER δδ
δω
−
−
=    [3] 
 
Table V includes the estimated parameters of the VECM model (Panel A) and 
the contributions to price discovery according to Gonzalo and Granger (1995) 
(Panel B). Firstly, the error-correction adjustment coefficients δEUA and δCER  are 
both statistically significant and with the expected signs. In absolute terms, the 
coefficients that accompany the ECT in the CER equations are bigger than 
those in the EUA equation, indicating that CER futures market is more sensible 
that the EUA futures markets. Secondly, according to Gonzalo and Granger 
(1995), the weight for the EUAs future market in price discovery is slightly 
superior to that of CER market, indicating that the price discovery process in the 
long-run is mainly conducted by the EUA market in the three equations. We can 
therefore conclude that EUAs lead clearly the market with a notable influence of 
CERs. 
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 [Please insert Table V] 
 
Regarding the short-run dynamics, Table V reveals that EUAs returns and 
CERs returns depend negatively on their own lagged values, while they depend 
positively on lagged returns of the other market. We have also performed short-
run causality tests. Specifically, for each equation in the VECM, we have tested 
whether the lagged coefficients of the other endogenous variable are jointly 
statistically different from zero. Table VI presents the results of the tests. The 
null hypothesis of joint significance cannot be rejected at the 1% level in the 
2008 futures contract, indicating that EUAs and CERs prices, in spite of sharing 
a common trend in the long-run, do not cause each other in the short-run. The 
picture changes in the 2009 case. Although the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected for the EUAs futures market, it is rejected for the CER market, showing 
a predominant role of the EUAs market over the CERs market in the short-run. 
Finally, in the 2010 case, we find evidence of bi-directional short-run causality. 
We can therefore conclude that the level of short-run integration of EUAs and 
CERs markets has increased through time.  
 
[Please insert Table VI] 
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5. Conclusions 
 
EUA and CER assets are traded in informationally linked electronic markets 
which share the same market microstructure (e.g. timetable, trading rules, 
settlement prices, etc.). In this paper, we extend previous literature on the EUA-
CER linkage by using, for the first time, intraday data. Firstly, we show that 
there is a long-run equilibrium relationship between EUAs and CERs futures 
prices. Secondly, we obtain that the EUAs market leads price discovery, 
although the role of CERs markets is also highly important. Thirdly, we show 
that the progressive convergence in EUAs and CERs futures prices through 
time affects the long-run equilibrium relationship between both markets. Finally, 
regarding the short-run dynamics between both markets, we find a transition 
from the absence of bidirectional causality in the 2008 futures contract to a 
clearly bidirectional feedback causality in the 2010 futures contract. 
 
The overall results indicate that both markets play an important role in price 
discovery. Despite its low relative share in the total trading activity in the carbon 
market, CERs contribution to discovery of the common efficient price is almost 
as important as the EUAs contribution. This finding together with the fact that 
the spread between EUAs and CERs prices has decreased over time, suggests 
that the policy uncertainties about CERs are disappearing.  
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Table I. Data facts 
The first and second lines present the data series. Third line indicates the number of 
transactions for each series. Forth to eighth lines present price facts such as the price mean, 
standard deviation, maximum, median and minimum prices. Ninth to twelfth lines show several 
volume facts such as the total and the average volume in lots (1 lot stands for 1,000 CO2 EU 
allowances), and the maximum and minimum volume in a transaction. Thirteenth and fourteenth 
lines indicate the time stamp of first and last transaction. Fifteenth and sixteenth lines present 
the first and last trading days for each contract. Seventeenth line shows the total number of 
trading days. Eighteenth and nineteenth lines point out the average number of transactions per 
day and per minute, respectively. The later is calculated as the total number of transactions 
divided by the total trading days and minutes, respectively. Twelfth line shows the average 
minutes between transactions, excluding non-trading time. Finally Twenty-firth and twenty-
secondth lines present the total number of price changes and it average per day, respectively. 
 
Contract EUA Futures CER Futures 
Maturity December 2008 December 2009 December 2010 December 2008 December 2009 December 2010 
Number of transactions 238,647 312,130 330,390 8,253 19,107 26,509 
Price mean 21.93 13.85 14.61 18.55 13.06 12.99 
Price std. deviation 3.38 2.77 1.61 2.46 3.00 2.23 
Maximum price 33.70 32.50 32.22 26.80 26.20 25.25 
Median price 22.25 13.73 14.70 19.20 12.45 12.49 
Minimum price 10.75 7.70 8.25 12.65 7.15 7.35 
Volume (in lots) 2,188,980 3,057,609 3,598,073 162,478 469,491 578,943 
Average volume per 
transaction (in lots) 9.17 9.80 10.89 19.69 24.57 21.84 
Maximum volume (in lots) 4,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 4,500 1,825 
Minimum volume (in lots) 1 1 1 1 1 1 
First transaction 17/06/2005 16:04 12/10/2005 13:20 26/01/2006 17:05 14/03/2008 07:00 14/03/2008 13:37 14/03/2008 13:37 
Last transaction 15/12/2008 16:41 14/12/2009 17:17 20/12/2010 16:59 15/12/2008 16:59 14/12/2009 16:56 30/09/2010 15:57 
First trading day 22/04/2005 22/04/2005 22/04/2005 14/03/2008 14/03/2008 14/03/2008 
Last trading day 15/12/2008 14/12/2009 20/12/2010 15/12/2008 14/12/2009 20/12/2010 
Number of trading days 934 1,188 1,447 194 448 707 
Transactions per day 255.51 262.73 228.32 42.54 42.64 37.49 
Transaction per minute 0.43 0.45 0.38 0.07 0.07 0.06 
Average minutes between 
transactions (ex overnight) 2.30 2.25 2.59 14.10 14.04 15.96 
Number of price changes 134,265 135,350 133,535 8,060 18,664 22,109 
Number of price changes 
per day 143.75 113.93 92.28 41.55 41.66 31.27 
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Table II. Unit root test 
KPSS stationarity test used both in levels and in first differences: First, the test with time trend 
and intercept in the model (a) has been carried out and, in case the time trend is not significant, 
we proceed to estimate the model only with intercept (b). The critical values at the 1% level are, 
for the model with intercept and time trend 0.216, and for the model only with intercept 0.739. 
(Kwiatkowski et al.,1992, Table 1, p. 166). 
 
 Level Model Differences Model 
2008 EUA Futures Contract  2.2635 (a) 0.1095* (b) 
2009 EUA Futures Contract  2.6734 (a) 0.1055* (b) 
2010 EUA Futures Contract  3.6481 (a) 0.1208* (b) 
2008 CER Futures Contract 2.5598 (a) 0.5041* (b) 
2009 CER Futures Contract 2.2049 (a) 0.1610* (b) 
2010 CER Futures Contract 2.8002 (a) 0.0571* (b) 
 
*Indicates that the null of stationarity cannot be rejected at the 1% level. 
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Table III. Cointegration tests 
The trace statistic tests the null hypothesis (H0) that there are r cointegration vectors, against 
the alternative hypothesis (H1) that exist, at least, r+1 cointegration vectors, where r goes from 0 
to 1. The maximum eigenvalues tests the null hypothesis (H0) that there are, as maximum, r 
cointegration vectors, against the alternative hypothesis (H1) that exist, as maximum, r+1 
cointegration vectors, where r goes from 0 to 1. The models incorporate intercept and time trend 
in data and has been chosen following the Schwarz Information Criterion. The optimum number 
of lags has been 5 for the model in Panel A, 2 for the model in Panel B, and 1 for the model in 
Panel C. The critical values are based on the response surface coefficients from MacKinnon et 
al. (1999). 
 
Panel A EUA and CER 2008 Futures Contract 
H0 H1 Trace λ Max 
r = 0 r > 0 41.5518* 37.1968* 
r ≤ 1 r > 1 4.3550 4.3550 
Panel B EUA and CER 2009 Futures Contract 
H0 H1 Trace λ Max 
r = 0 r > 0 195.5907* 191.6219* 
r ≤ 1 r > 1 3.9688 3.9688 
Panel C EUA and CER 2010 Futures Contract 
H0 H1 Trace λ Max 
r = 0 r > 0 198.5527* 193.3681* 
r ≤ 1 r > 1 5.1847 5.1847 
 
*Indicates rejection at 1% level. 
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Table IV. Restrictions on the cointegration vector 
Panel A presents the long-run tests for the hypothesis that j variable does not enter in any 
cointegration vector (H0: B(i,j) =0), where B(i,j) is the cointegration coefficient where i is the 
bivariate system (2008, 2009 and 2010 EUA and CER futures contracts) and j is the variable 
number in the cointegrating equation (j=EUA, CER). The reported statistics are distributed as a 
2χ  random variable with 1 degree of freedom. Panel B presents the long-run tests for the 
hypothesis that TREND variable does not enter in any cointegration vector. 
 
Panel A EUA and CER 2008 EUA and CER 2009 EUA and CER 2010 
Variable 2χ  p-value 2χ  p-value 2χ  p-value 
EUAt-1 32.21156  0.000000 174.4765 0.000000  181.1691 0.000000 
CERt-1 31.01296 0.000000 186.3839 0.000000 183.6680 0.000000 
    
Panel B EUA and CER 2008 EUA and CER 2009 EUA and CER 2010 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Trend  4.00E-05 3.2E-06 1.36E-05 1.2E-06 4.16E-06 7.4E-07 
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Table V. Vector error correction model 
Panel A shows the adjustment and short-run estimated coefficients for the estimated VEC 
Model based on Schwarz Information Criterion. ECTt-1 stands for the error correction term of the 
cointegrating equation. * indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of zero coefficient at the 1% 
level. Panel B presents the weights ωj (j=EUA, CER) with which each market enter the common 
long memory component defined by Gonzalo and Granger (1995). 
 
Panel A EUA and CER 2008 EUA and CER 2009 EUA and CER 2010 
Variable ΔEUA ΔCER ΔEUA ΔCER ΔEUA ΔCER 
C -0.000087 -0.000039 -0.000006 -0.000023 -0.000049 -0.000023 
ECTt-1 -0.015435* 0.016243* -0.009787* 0.021305* -0.007108* 0.007944* 
ΔEUAt-1 -0.737684* 0.014100 -0.459157* -0.016248 -0.236353* 0.022459* 
ΔEUAt-2 -0.543076* 0.032642 -0.257012* 0.025499* - - 
ΔEUAt-3 -0.413451* 0.026375 - - - - 
ΔEUAt-4 -0.303392* 0.018613 - - - - 
ΔEUAt-5 -0.114401* 0.014813 - - - - 
ΔCERt-1 0.029095 -0.340992* 0.001735 -0.283514* 0.059448* -0.120322* 
ΔCERt-2 0.038430 -0.219308* 0.011421 -0.160581* - - 
ΔCERt-3 0.024300 -0.187014* - - - - 
ΔCERt-4 0.004275 -0.148894* - - - - 
ΔCERt-5 -0.014816 -0.134791* - - - - 
    
Panel B ΔEUA ΔCER ΔEUA ΔCER ΔEUA ΔCER 
ωj 0.51275333 0.48724667 0.6852245 0.314775505 0.5277704 0.472229604 
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Table VI. Short-run causality test 
For each equation in the VEC the output displays χ2 statistics for the joint significance of each of 
the other lagged endogenous variables in that equation. k indicates the number of lags included 
in the VEC model. 
 
    Endogenous variables 
  2008 Future Contracts 2009 Future Contracts 2010 Future Contracts 
   ΔEUAt ΔCERt ΔEUAt ΔCERt ΔEUAt ΔCERt 
 H0:β1=…= βk=0 Χ2  6.5820  19.7714  23.5948 
 p-value  0.2536  0.0001  0.0000 
 H0:γ1=…= γk=0 Χ2 10.7552  2.7351  58.1116  
 p-value 0.0565  0.2547  0.0000  
 K 5 5 2 2 1 1 
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Figure I. Illiquidity 
From left to right the upper division exhibits the figures for the daily illiquidity approach proposed in Amihud (2002), for 2008, 2009 and 2010 EUAs futures 
contracts. Similarly, the figures in the bottom division show the figures for the daily illiquidity approach for 2008, 2009 and 2010 CERs futures contracts. 
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Figure II. Evolution of intraday prices 
From left to right the upper division exhibits the figures for the historical intraday prices of the last transaction occurred in intervals of fifteen minutes for 2008, 
2009 and 2010 EUAs and CERs futures contracts. Similarly, the figures in the bottom division show the historical daily settlement prices for 2008, 2009 and 
2010 EUAs and CERs futures contracts. 2008 EUA and CER futures contracts refers to the futures contracts maturing in December 15, 2008; 2009 EUA and 
CER Futures Contracts refers to the futures contracts maturing in December 14, 2009; and 2010 EUA and CER Futures Contracts refers to the futures 
contracts maturing in December 20, 2010. 
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